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SMALL THINGS LIKE REASONS ARE PUT IN A
JAR:t REASON AND LEGITIMACY IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Jerry L. Mashaw*
"Why" is a multi-purpose word. It is the language of curiosity,
evidence of intellectual engagement. We revel in our children's and
our students' whys; reward their curiosity with attention and serious
responses; turn their whys back on them-"why do you think?"-to
stimulate independent thought, reflection.
"Why" is also a language of attention getting, even harassment.
One of my favorite cartoons-I think it's from The New Yorker,
perhaps by Ogden Nash-shows a small child leaning forward from
the back seat close to his driving father's ear. The conversation must
have been the familiar one with a bored four-year old on a car trip:
"Why aren't we there yet?" "Why are you going so slow?" "Why
does Grandma live so far away?" and so on, and on. The caption at
the bottom gives the harassed father's response: "Shut up, he
explained."
"Why" is also ubiquitously the language of disappointment, even
despair. It articulates a demand for comfort and for justice; a quest
for understanding that often reaches beyond the facts of the matter.
Indeed, "why" may signal the collapse of a world view, an anxious,
even desperate attempt to reconceive of ourselves and our world in a
way that makes sense; that permits our lives to go on as an
understandable narrative.
These most excruciating whys, the ones that reveal our souls'
confusion and torment, may be simultaneously irresistible and
hopeless. The title of this lecture is taken from a 1960s song Comin'
Back to Me by Jefferson Airplane. But the vocalist's lover is not
coming back. He knows he's only dreaming. He knows as well that
the reasons for the breakup are completely inadequate explanations
SJefferson Airplane, Comin' Back to AMe, on Surrealistic Pillow (RCA Records 1967).
Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University. This essay was originally presented as
the Robert L. Levine Distinguished Lecture at Fordham University School of Law on
March 27, 2001.
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for what went wrong. Reasons have been demanded, but in his
emotional devastation they have turned out to be trivial-small things
to put in a jar. Paul Simon later gave instruction on "Fifty Ways to
Leave Your Lover." None of them involved explanation.
Job repeatedly asked God "why," but the answers were of little use
to him. In Carl Jung's famous interpretation of the Book of Job,,
Job's quest is for an answer that he could not possibly accept. Job's
"why" sounds in morality and justice. God's answer is in the
willfulness of the Old Testament, a will beyond human understanding.
For Jung, Job's quest for understanding demonstrates his moral
superiority to the God he interrogates; it is a human quest for justice
in the face of a force for whom justification is irrelevant.
It is, of course, this particular discourse of whyness, with its
expectation of reason-giving, that I want to explore this afternoon.
Reason has become the modern language of law in a liberal state.
The anguished why of the contemporary Job confronting
contemporary secular authority often carries with it an enforceable
demand for justification. If our secular Job is to be treated as an
independent moral agent, a citizen of a regime which can claim to
respect persons as ends rather than merely means, his disappointment
must be explained.
I want to ask some of my own why questions about this familiar
legal language of whyness. Why do reasons matter? What reasons
count? When do reasons satisfy our longing for justice? When do
they fail? Why?
These are deep and abiding questions about which legal and
political philosophers have had much to say over hundreds of years. I
will not try to plumb the philosophic depths of these issues in a few
minutes. When my wife, Anne, and I travel with our dear friends
Bruce and Susan Ackerman, Anne imposes a simple conversational
rule on Bruce, a man well known for his philosophic enthusiasms.
Her rule is "No Heidigger before breakfast." It is, I assure you, a rule
that makes everybody better off. Conversation must be appropriate
to the time and place and the capacities of the conversationalists.
So I will comment on these timeless issues mostly from the vantage
point of my own particular field, administrative law. I do not believe
that this limitation trivializes the subject. Indeed, I want to convince
you that the discourse of whyness and of reason-giving is more
important here than anywhere else in American law. Administrative
law's struggle with the uses of reason and reason-giving as the
foundation of legal legitimacy provides insights of a special sort into
the relationship of law and reason-and into the work that remains to
be done to bring that struggle to a successful conclusion.
1. C. G. Jung, Answer to Job (R.F.C. Hull trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1973)
(1958).
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SMALL THINGS LIKE REASONS
I. THE PLACE OF REASON IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

One might object, of course, that the substitution of reason for
myth, tradition, culture or inherited power, as the basis for law and
political legitimacy, describes the whole project of modernity. As selfactualizing agents in the Cartesian sense-we think, therefore, we
are-we are also self-governing moral agents. We can understand
ourselves only to the extent that we can give ourselves reasons for
actions that correspond to a life plan that we recognize as our own.
And we can understand ourselves as members of an acceptable system
for collective governance, bound together by authoritative rules and
principles, only to the extent that we can explain why those rules and
principles ought to be viewed as binding. The authority of all law
relies on a set of complex reasons for believing that it should be
authoritative. Unjustifiable law demands reform, unjustifiable legal
systems demand revolution.
But the reign of reason plays itself out in different ways in different
domains of authoritative legal decision-making. We have in crucial
ways given up on the project of rationality as applied to legislative
action. As a constitutional matter we do not require that the
legislature have a "rational basis" for its actions, only that we could
imagine one. And, while it is virtually impossible to avoid purposive
interpretation of statutory pronouncements, that is, to attempt to
apply the statute consistently with the "reasons" underlying its
enactment, we know that those reasons are post-hoc constructions
ascribed to a metaphorical "it" that is really a "they." Save in special
constitutional contexts where fundamental human interests can only
be overridden by pressing state needs, the legislature need not have
investigated the facts of the matter, analyzed them cogently, or been
motivated by whatever reason can be constructed as a justification for
its action.2
This difference between legislative and administrative reason as a
ground for the legitimacy of action was candidly acknowledged some
years ago by Judge Wilkey of the District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals in a case involving the validity of certain standards
adopted by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
While striking down the agency's regulation as having no adequate
rationalization, the court felt constrained to uphold two parts of the
rule that had been expressly mandated by Congress. Recognizing that
his discussion of the apparent irrationality of the rule applied equally

2. Struggles concerning which human interests are "fundamental," and what
level of rationality must be demonstrated to override those interests, nevertheless
generate much litigation and massive scholarly analysis. For a selection. see, e.g.,
Geoffrey R. Stone et al., Constitutional Law 813-1048 (3d ed. 1996).
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to all its parts, Judge Wilkey remarked simply, "No administrative
procedure test applies to an act of Congress."3
Nor has reason colonized judicial decision-making as an exclusive
ground for legitimacy in the way that it inhabits administrative law.
At first blush this may seem an odd claim. Law talk as it is carried on
in the profession as well as in the academy is almost maniacally
fixated on the reasons given by appellate judges as justifications for
their decisions. Yet the law treats the necessity and the importance of
reason-giving in judicial dispute resolution very differently than it
treats the force of reason in administrative law. The bulk of all
private adjudication is settled prior to judgment. The judge need give
no reason for failing to render a decision other than that the parties
themselves decided to forgo judicial intervention.
For anyone
committed to adjudication as the preeminent rational discourse for
the development of law the ubiquitousness of settlement is deeply
disturbing.'
Moreover, many civil cases, and most criminal ones, that go to trial
are decided by jury verdicts. We have self-consciously made the jury a
black box. Its results are known, but its reasons are both mysterious
and irrelevant to the path of the law. A jury verdict is illegitimate
only in those exceedingly rare cases where no rational argument could
have been constructed to justify the result. Like the legislature's duty
to satisfy the "rational basis" test, the jury's verdict is subject only to
the constraint of hypothetical reason.
Even in the realm of appellate court judgment numerous legal rules
suppress the importance of the judicial rationale. That a lower court
gave the wrong reasons for a correct decision is not by itself a
justification for reversal or remand. By contrast, perhaps the most
common ground for reversal of an administrative institution's order is
failure to rationalize its decision adequately. When analyzing the
authoritativeness of prior judicial determinations it is commonplace
for lawyers, judges, and commentators to strip away all judicial
rationalization not found, on post-hoc analysis, to be absolutely
essential to the decision. Most of what courts say in justification for
their decision-making is cast by common convention into the outer
darkness of obiter dictum. Small things like judicial reasons are often
put in a jar, which is then put out with the trash.
I am not claiming, of course, that reason plays no role in
legitimating both legislative and judicial action. My claim is only that
the legitimacy of legislative or judge-made law draws on sources other
than rationality or reason-giving. We speak unselfconsciously not of
legislative reason but of the legislative will. Law in its legislative form

3. Nat'l Tire Dealers & Retreaders Ass'n v. Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31, 37 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
4. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073 (1984).
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is the aggregation of preferences legitimated by periodic elections. It
is at best a clunky system and a deep disappointment to those who
believe that democracy should be deliberative and expressive, that is,
rational, rather than willful.' Indeed, in an earlier era in which
parliaments were struggling to wrest power from monarchs, the
legislature's image was that of a deliberatively rational institution
juxtaposed against the willfulness of the executive embodied in the
crown.
Adjudicative legitimacy flows as much from judges' capacities to
settle disputes authoritatively as from their capacity to create welljustified legal norms. While the fragmented and transparently
incoherent opinions in Bush v. Gore' deeply trouble the chattering
classes, a substantial majority of Americans seem to have welcomed a
simple authoritative resolution to an election that had become a bore.
The Court would perhaps have done less damage to its own legitimacy
had it issued the decision with no reasons at all. Too bad the Court
could not use a jury and base legitimacy on some inarticulate sense of
justice represented by a random selection of ordinary citizens.
By contrast, a retreat to political will or intuition is almost always
unavailable to modern American administrative decisionmakers. The
electoral connection is generally unavailable as a justification for
administrative action. Administrators, of course, have two possible
connections to the electorate: the appointment of all high level
administrative personnel by the President and the ultimate derivation
of virtually all administrative authority from the legislature. But, it is
a rare case in which an administrator called upon to justify a decision
can respond simply, "The President made me do it," or "The Congress
said so." Indeed, such claims delegitimate administrative action
rather than count as good reasons. Pressure by the people's
representatives in congressional hearings may cause an agency's
adjudicatory determinations to be invalidated, or the hearing's
participants to be disqualified as administrative adjudicators.7 Even
nonadjudicatory action, such as a decision about where or whether to
build a road segment, may be invalidated when based on
congressional pressure to consider matters not within the four corners
of the statute under which the administrator operates.' And, in
"quasi-legislative," rulemaking proceedings, administrative law
doctrine counsels administrators against any ex parte communications

5. For an attempt to square administrative governance with civic republican
aspirations and for citation of some of the extensive civic republicanism literature. see
Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105
Harv. L. Rev. 1512 (1992).
6. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
7. Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952, 963-65 (5th Cir. 1966).
8. D.C. Fed. of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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with elected officials that are not memorialized and described in the
rulemaking record.'
Directives from the President often fare no better, as Harry Truman
learned in the famous Steel Seizure case 0 during the Korean Conflict.
More recently, the almost equally famous State Farm case,
concerning the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's
passive restraints rule, stands broadly for the proposition that a
change of administrative ideology consequent upon a presidential
election cannot provide a sufficient reason for rescinding an
administrative rule. The rescission of a rule, like its adoption, must be
rationalized in terms of relevant statutory criteria and social,
economic, or scientific facts spread upon the rulemaking record.
More recently yet, President Clinton announced that he was
"authorizing" the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to regulate
tobacco as a drug. 12 Not only was this "authorization" ineffective in
protecting the FDA's regulations from invalidation, the FDA did not
even attempt to rely on the political legitimacy of presidential power
as a basis for its exercise of jurisdiction. The whole burden of the
FDA's legal argument emphasized technocratic rationality-new
knowledge concerning
the way in which cigarettes were manufactured
13
and marketed.
To some extent these failures of political justification,
administrative law's attempt to insulate reason from politics, are
protections for an alternative connection between administration and
politics-an attempt to ensure an agency's fidelity to a statute enacted
by elected representatives and signed by an elected President. But,
while statutory authority is a necessary condition for legitimate
administrative action, it is far from sufficient. Authority must be
combined with reasons, which usually means accurate fact-finding and
sound policy analysis. Otherwise, an administrator's rule or order will
be declared "arbitrary," perhaps even "capricious."' 4
Moreover, as those who decry the toothlessness of the nondelegation doctrine constantly remind us, the vacuity of statutory
terms stretches the thread that binds administrative action to electoral

9. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 400-08 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
10. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
11. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n. of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
12. President Bill Clinton, Press Conference at the White House (Aug. 10, 1995).
1995 WL 472181.
13. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 170-71 (2000)

(discussing the FDA's legal justifications for its tobacco regulations).
14. See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994)
(stating that a "reviewing court shall.., hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law").
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preferences virtually to the breaking point." When the Congress tells
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in the Motor
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 to "meet the need for motor vehicle
safety" 16 it has done little more than to tell the agency to go forth and
do good.
Nor can agencies borrow much legitimacy from simple conflict
resolution or jury-like allocation of decisional competence to ordinary
citizens.
The insinuation of stake holder negotiation into
administrative procedures is often viewed as a corruption of the
administrative process. Agency use of advisory committees or
"regulatory negotiation" is surrounded by a host of constraints to
ensure that the agency remains firmly in control of the ultimate
regulatory product.1 7 Moreover, none of these devices reduces the
agency's obligation to explain its decision in instrumentally rational
terms.
Even settlements, while hardly unknown in agency enforcement,
may nevertheless be subject to demands for rationalization backed by
judicial review. And, many encounters between government agencies
and private parties cannot in any meaningful sense be "settled."
Whether a citizen is entitled to Social Security disability benefits, or to
a commercial aviation license, has to be decided. The reasons given
for these decisions are then subject to review to ensure that an
adequately rational explanation has been provided. Where an
agency's mission demands actions that outrun cogent articulation of
reasons we have usually stumbled into an arena in which lotteries or
market solutions are more appropriate means of decision-making.
Reform then proceeds in the direction of "deregulation." The
alternative economic rationality of the market, or the probabilistic
equality of a fair drawing, are substituted as legitimating devices for
the reasonableness of administrative law.
This connection between administration and reason is a familiar
theme in the social and political theory of modernity. Max Weber
famously explained the legitimacy of bureaucratic activity as its
promise to exercise power on the basis of knowledge." And the
American Progressive Movement extolled the virtues of
15. See generally Symposium, The PhoenLr Rises Again: The Nondelegation
Doctrine from Constitutionaland Policy Perspectives, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 731 (1999)
(reviewing the jurisprudence and literature concerning the non-delegation doctrine).
16. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L 89-563, §
103(a), 80 Stat. 718,719 (1966), repealedby 15 U.S.C. § 1381 (1994).
17. E.g., Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Star. 4969
(1990), 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-70 (2000); Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, Pub. L
No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (1990), 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-84 (2000); Federal Advisory
Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972), amended by Pub. L No. 94409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976), 5 U.S.C. app. § 1015 (2000).
18. Max Weber, 3 Economy and Society 956-1003 (Guenther Roth & Claus
Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., 1968).
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administration in terms both of substantive expertise and the creation
of "rational democracy." 19 But administrative decision-making in the
United States was not always so focused on rationality and reasongiving as the touchstones of legal legitimacy. Indeed, pre-New Deal
administrative law had relatively thin rationality requirements.
One of my favorite illustrations is Justice Brandeis' decision in a
1935 case involving agricultural regulation in Oregon."° The Oregon
agricultural authorities, operating under a statute demanding that they
"'promote... the horticulture interests' of the State," had adopted a
regulation on the marketing of berries that excluded the use of all
containers save one style of box-a box that just happened to be
manufactured only in Oregon."' The reasons for the agricultural
authority's solicitation concerning the boxing of berries were nowhere
revealed in its regulatory issuances. But, in a due process challenge
urging the substantive irrationality of the regulation, Justice Brandeis
simply analogized administrative regulation to legislation.
The
constitutional question he said was simply whether some state of
affairs might be imagined under which the Oregon regulation would
be a rational means for carrying out the legislative mandate. 2
Because few more imaginative Justices ever graced the bench, Justice
Brandeis found himself easily equal to the task. As a constitutional
matter, administrative rationality, at least in the domain of
rulemaking, was to be subjected to no stronger test than the
hypothetical rationality applied to legislation.
But, the burgeoning of the administrative state during the New
Deal and the Second World War produced a strong reaction against
what Roscoe Pound, among others, described as "administrative
absolutism." 3 The statutory embodiment of this reaction is the 1946
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").24 And, while the APA
seemed at the time to make modest demands for agency articulation
of reasons, developments since that time, both in the interpretation of
the APA and the statutory prescription of other, more far-reaching,
rationality requirements, are astonishing.
The modest suggestion in section 553 of the APA that agencies
must file a "concise statement of the basis and purpose" of a
regulation has developed into the requirement of a comprehensive
articulation of the factual bases, methodological presuppositions, and
19. For a classical discussion of the progressive view of good government, see
Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States (1908).
20. Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935).
21. Id. at 180-82.
22. Id. at 181-82.
23. Pound's views on the administrative state can be found, among other places, in
Roscoe Pound, Administrative Law: Its Growth, Procedure, and Significance, 7 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 269 (1941).
24. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1994)).
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statutory authority that justifies any exercise of rulemaking. To make
certain that this exercise in instrumental rationality is real rather than
hypothetical, courts routinely reject "post-hoc rationalizations,"' z the
agency's use of untested facts outside the rulemaking record, 6 and
attempts to rely on unarticulated reservoirs of agency "expertise. '"zr
They demand, in addition, persuasive responses to cogent objections
by outside parties. 2
Specific regulatory statutes have gone far beyond the APA to add a
host of analytic requirements to particular regulatory functions. And
a plethora of more general, framework statutes have made agency
rulemaking into what29 some have characterized as an exercise in
"synoptic" rationality. In addition to rationalizing action in terms of
their principal missions agencies must routinely consider the
environmental consequences of their actions; provide cost benefit
analyses of regulatory alternatives; consider impacts on particular
clienteles; and assure objectors that, having canvassed the universe of
possible actions, they have chosen the least burdensome alternative to
accomplish their statutorily specified ends."'
In some arenas of agency rulemaking observers claim that these
multiple requirements for synoptic or comprehensive rationality have
brought policymaking to a virtual standstill. Others suspect that the
demand for rationality has moved from a concern for justification and
legitimacy into the realm of harassment 3 Many agencies would
certainly relish the opportunity to follow the practice of the
disgruntled father who had at least some chance of getting away with
an utterance like "Shut up, he explained."
Rationality as the
touchstone of legitimacy in the liberal, administrative state has been
enthroned as a sometime tyrant.
A similar story can be told about other domains of administrative
action. The due process revolution, along with congressional
attentiveness in modem statutes to the provision of formal
25. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,420-21
(1971).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir.
1977) (requiring release during notice and comment period of scientific data used as
basis for rule).
27. See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
28. For a compendium of materials on the requirements of administrative
rulemaking, see Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Guide to Federal Agency Rulemaking (3d ed.
1998).
29. See generally Thomas 0. McGarity, Reinventing Rationality: The Role of
Regulatory Analysis in the Federal Bureaucracy (1991).
30. A compendium of these statutes along with related executive orders can be
found in the Federal Administrative Procedure Sourcebook (William F. Funk et al.
eds., 3d ed. 2000). The Sourcebook now runs a mere 1003 pages.
31. My own intemperate remarks on this matter can be found in Jerry L Mashaw,
Reinventing Government and Regulatory Reform: Studies in the Neglect and Abuse of
Administrative Law, 57 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 405 (1996).
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adjudicatory process, has dramatically increased the demand for
transparently rational administrative adjudication. With only modest
recent retrenchments, the multi-decade judicial project of eliminating
domains of inarticulate administrative discretion has brought reasongiving to administrative inaction, enforcement, and agenda setting3 areas long thought protected from judicial supervision with its
incessant demand for transparent rationality.
To be sure, the triumph of reason has not been complete in
administrative law. I have painted here with a broad brush, leaving
aside many qualifications and counter-currents. I believe nevertheless
that my central point is almost undeniable. The path of American
administrative law has been the path of the progressive submission of
power to reason. The promise of the administrative state was to bring
competence to politics. It is the institutional embodiment of the
enlightenment project to substitute reason for the dark forces of
culture, tradition, and myth. Administrators must not only give
reasons, they must give complete ones. We insist that they be
authentic by demanding that they be both transparent and
contemporaneous. 33 "Expertise" is no longer a protective shield to be
worn like a sacred vestment. It is a competence to be demonstrated
by cogent reason-giving.
II. FROM TRIUMPH TO DISAPPOINTMENT

From this perspective, the development of American administrative
law represents the triumph of the idea of reason in public life. For a
host of reasons this is a triumph to be celebrated. We do not want
environmental regulation based on myth, or an individual's
deservedness for Social Security benefits decided on the basis of
inarticulate cultural premises. We are deeply divided over appeals to
the sacred in public life, and, whatever the sociological fact of the
matter, reliance on hereditary status as a basis for exercising power
has always seemed un-American. We treasure an independent
judiciary, but only so long as we are convinced that we are keeping
most of public policymaking out of its hands. We do not wish to be
governed by the "artificial reason" of the law in courts. And while we
prize elections, we seldom believe that politicians have received a
mandate for relentless pursuit of their particular visions of the good.
We do not view ourselves as in the business of electing dictators who
can rule by decree while hiding behind "the will of the people."
32. Notwithstanding the broad dicta in Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), the
courts have found a multitude of devices for submitting administrative enforcement
and regulatory discretion to review, thereby requiring that agencies justify their
failure either to enforce or to regulate. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw et al.,
Administrative Law: The American Public Law System 868-901 (4th ed. 1998).
33. The iconic statement of this position is Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc.
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
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My claim then is that American administrative government is not
just a story of the triumph of reason. It is a story of the triumph of
legitimate, liberal governance in a world full of dangerous
alternatives.
Yet in 2001, to celebrate the administrative state seems bizarre, at
best anachronistic. Have we not spent the last three decades
excoriating government? Every president since Lyndon Johnson has
run against it. "Bureaucrat" is not a term of approbation. Even Bill
Clinton, the electoral heir of Franklin Roosevelt, declared the era of
big government to be over. Promises to get the government off
peoples' backs and out of the hands of pointy-headed bureaucrats are
unfailing applause lines. Woodrow Wilson was probably the lastperhaps the only-president to celebrate the triumph of reason in the
administrative state. Something has gone terribly wrong, and the
voice from the backseat, now in a truly inquisitive mode, wants to
know why.
The short answer, of course, is that I don't know. But the demands
of academic lectures and occasions such as this one require that I say
more than that. "Shut up, he explained," just won't do. So in the
remaining few minutes I want to provide some tentative explanations
for what might be called our "post-modern anxiety" about
administrative governance, and to sketch out an agenda for
conversation, thought, and perhaps research.
III. ROUNDING UP THE USUAL SUSPECTS

A large number of candidates come to mind as explanations for our
discontent. Simple human cussedness is, of course, one of them. In a
country born in revolution and dedicated to constant improvement we
celebrate success momentarily, on the way to our next reform
campaign. But, this explanation, because it explains our discontent
with everything, carries no particular lesson for our discontent with
the administrative state.
An almost equally broad explanation involves our famously antistate, political ideology. We simply distrust government, believe
smaller government is always better than bigger, and locate
government itself primarily in those functionaries, read
"administrators," who actually carry out or implement public policy.
We blame the Department of Motor Vehicles for long lines at the
counters, not the legislature that refuses to fund additional personnel
and equipment. We blame the IRS for our incomprehensible personal
income tax form, not the Congress that seems incapable of tax
simplification. All of these petty frustrations and disappointments are
rolled into a general ideological package that exalts the private
market and private voluntary action, while decrying the public sector.
We somehow forget that these same experiences await us at the bank
if we want to do anything more complicated than use the ATM-and
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much worse ones should we be so unlucky as to have a question about
our health insurance.
This ideological explanation is, of course, not necessarily a rejection
of reason as the grounding for legitimacy. One way to explain a promarket ideological preference is that it represents a claim about a
particular form of rationality. We prefer the rationality of the market
to the quite distinct rationality of administrative policy development.
The market after all makes decisions, millions of them, in a
decentralized, non-coercive, almost invisible fashion. Moreover, there
is ample evidence that as an engine for aggregate economic welfare,
market determinations of product variety, quality, and price are hard
to beat. For some of us, discontent with the administrative state is a
complaint about allocation of decisional authority between the public
and private spheres, however difficult it may be to separate one
sharply from the other.
But this is not a very satisfactory explanation either. However
much we may say we despise government in general, we
overwhelmingly support government programs. There is no electoral
majority for getting rid of the major programs of the American
welfare state, or of the American regulatory state either. Al Smith
was the last politician to run against the Social Security system.
George W. Bush wants us to believe that he is a committed, but
sensible, environmentalist. The notion that we are unhappy with
administrative government because we want to turn the whole domain
of government provision over to the private sector is belied by both
our conduct and what we say in public opinion polls. We are not
prepared to substitute the "rationality of the market" anywhere and
everywhere for the rationalized policy choice embodied in collective
governmental action.
We are ideological conservatives and
operational liberals. 4 Indeed, a moment's reflection reveals that
many of our demands on government are precisely that government
bureaucrats protect us from private ones.
Nor am I really attracted by the post-modem sensibility that
suggests that we distrust the administrative state because we know
rationality to be a sham. As that argument goes, reasons can always
be given and made more or less plausible.

What reasons we are

prepared to accept or reject are conditioned, indeed determined, by
social structures that reflect existing power arrangements. Reason is
not a justification for power, it is power's benign face, a mask that
consoles as it misleads. Reasons really are small things to put in a jar.
They are the pathetic coinage with which the powerful buy off the

34. For an extended treatment, see Lloyd A. Free & Hadley Cantril, The Political
Beliefs of Americans: A Study of Public Opinion (1967).
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powerless in a legitimacy game that preserves the hegemony of the
hegemons. 5
There is some truth to these claims, of course, but they
simultaneously prove too much and offer too little. They suggest at
their most extravagant that there is no real difference between the
administrative rationality of the U.S. Social Security administration
and the administrative rationality of the Rwandan military police.
From the critical perspective, the regulations of the Environmental
Protection Agency involve the same sort of transfer of power to
special interests as do milk marketing orders in our truly corrupt
system of dairy price supports. The deconstructionist project is
occasionally illuminating, but it cuts too broad a swath. And its
positive program is nonexistent. Some English departments are postmodern, most Americans are not. Our collective life must be
managed, not merely interpreted.
But in rejecting these general explanations for our discontent with
the rationalized administrative state I do not mean to suggest that no
genuine complaints exist. Far from it, I want to suggest instead where
I think our project of rationality and reason-giving has gone wrongor, if that's too strong, has been inadequate. In my view the fault is
not that the project has been about reason or reason-giving when it
should have been about something else. My hunch is that the problem
lies in too narrow a definition of rationality-in too cramped a style of
reason-giving. In many instances the reasons we are given fail to
respect our humanity. They treat us as people for whom reasons
matter, but fail to attend to the range of reasons that we care about.
Here I want to borrow from and misuse some categories or domains
of reason pioneered by the contemporary German political
philosopher Jtirgen Habermas. I will not, I promise you, have much
to say about Habermas.3 6 The no-Heidigger-before-breakfast rule
should surely have a complement: no Habermas after 6:00 p.m. But
the basic idea is just this:
Almost everywhere in the democratic, developed world we find a
highly articulated system for administrative self-government that
verges on paralysis. The necessity for state action is combined with
deep suspicion and alienation. The administrative state, certainly the
American one, is drowning in rationality requirements because it can
legitimate itself only by appeals to rationality. Yet it is failing to
assure the public either of its effectiveness or its bona fides.
35. For an elegant analysis of U.S. administrative law and corporation law from
this perspective, see Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law,
97 Harv. L. Rev. 1276 (1984).
36. For concise introductions to Habermas" thought. see, e.g., Arie Brand, The
Force of Reason: An Introduction to Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action
(1990); David Ingram. Habermas and the Dialectic of Reason (1987): and Stephen K.
White, The Recent Work of Jtirgen Habermas: Reason. Justice and Modernity (1988).
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In Habermas' account we all operate in three broad domains of
rational action: the material, the social, and the personal. Claims to
rationality in these three domains are quite different. In the material
world the claim is to truth. In the social realm the claim is about
rightness or justice. In the personal domain, rational validity sounds
in authenticity rather than in truth or right action. The problem of
state legitimacy is at its base a problem of its overcapacity to address
truth claims combined with its undercapacity to address claims of
justice and authenticity. Administrative action not only leaves claims
of justice and authenticity unaddressed, it often treats these issues as if
reasons focused on truth or factual validity answered our demands for
reasons of a quite different sort. To bring these highly abstract ideas
down to earth, consider a few examples of the affronts to authenticity
and our sense of justice that routinely flow from the activities of the
administrative state.
Insults to authenticity are, of course, the primary complaint about
bureaucracy in general. We are confronted everywhere by rules that
do not seem to fit our particular cases. Application of the rules not
only disappoints our expectations, it often seems to falsify our
experience, and to challenge our conceptions of ourselves as
autonomous moral agents.
I have spent an inordinate amount of time looking at the process for
determining Social Security disability claims. This is a highly rulebound system that processes millions of claims through the activities
of thousands of adjudicators. Over half of those who apply for
benefits have their claims denied. They find these denials deeply
perplexing. Quite often claimants have struggled to continue to work
despite serious impairments, and the advice of family members and
physicians that they really should not persevere. Having resolved
finally to accept a status, "disabled worker," that they have struggled
to avoid, they are told by disability adjudicators that they were wrong.
They may be a "failed" worker, unable to get and hold a job, but
according to the Social Security Administration's rules they are not
disabled.
Many find this determination unacceptable. They pursue further
levels of appeal, which permit them to individualize their cases by the
presentation of additional evidence and participate in face-to-face
meetings that the rule-bound lower levels of adjudication have not
provided.
More than half of those who go on to this more
contextualized process of adjudication are granted benefits. 7
But the story does not end here. Many successful claimants are also
vaguely unhappy with their favorable results. In order to receive
37. For recent data on Social Security Disability adjudications, see Social Security
Advisory Bd., Disability Decision Making: Data and Materials (2001), available at
http://www.ssab.gov/reports.html.

2001]

SMALL THINGS LIKE REASONS

income support that they desperately need, they have been forced to
accept a label, "disabled," that they fundamentally reject. The system
demands an all or nothing result. It applies its binary judgments to
individuals whose complex reality is falsified by both the grant and the
denial of their claims.
There are, of course, many other cases, involving different types of
administrative decisions, in which hard-edged rules cannot be
avoided. And the persistent human demand for individualization, for
judgments that reflect authentic, individual situations, constantly fuels
the fires of litigation. Commercial airline pilots, for example, have
waged war in the courts' for over two decades against FAA rules that
pluck them from the cockpit at age 60 with no attempt to determine
whether the particular grounded pilot poses a greater-than-average
risk of the sort of sudden incapacitation that the age 60 rule is
designed to guard against. Every pilot's lawsuit has foundered on the
shoals of basic administrative law doctrine. "Reasonable" general
rules are legally valid even though their application may lead to
erroneous judgments in particular cases. 9 To regain their sense of
self, the grounded pilots should stop litigating and enter triathlon
competitions.
Neither administrators nor the courts have ever developed a
language within which to talk sensibly about the issues of authenticity
raised by these ubiquitous instances of administrative or legislative
rule-ishness. The Supreme Court has been almost psychotic on the
subject. It has generally applied a rational basis test that justifies most
rules no matter how tenuous the objective proxy criteria they
substitute for the real questions of interest. Yet occasionally the
Court has flirted with an "irrebutable presumption" doctrine'" that, by
demanding that rules perfectly fit the purposes for which they are
promulgated, threatens to lay to waste most of the United States Code
and the Code of Federal Regulations. Asked again and again how
large an affront to individual authenticity is permissible in the name of
administrative efficiency, or some other collective value, the legal
system has remained either ambivalent or mute."
Indeed, elsewhere in administrative law the courts seem to shrink
from this dignitary issue virtually wherever it appears. In standing
cases, the Supreme Court has been heard to tell African American
parents that they lack sufficient "interest" in IRS regulations favoring
38. The battle began in Air Line Pilots Ass'n. Int'l. r. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d
Cir. 1960).
39. The foundational Supreme Court cases are Fed. Power Comni'n. v. Texaco
Inc, 377 U.S. 33 (1964), and United States v.Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
40. Note, The Irrebutable PresunptionDoctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 Harv. L
Rev. 1534 (1974).
41. For a discussion that reveals how difficult this issue can be, see Colin S. Diver.
The Optimal Precisionof Administrative Rules, 93 Yale LJ.65 (1983).
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segregated academies to support their standing to litigate the legality
of those rules.42 Infirm elderly have been told that they are not
entitled to a hearing concerning the closure of their nursing home, and
their necessary ejection from it, because the Medicaid statute that
pays their bills gives them no "entitlement" to payment to any
particular home.4 3

Cases like these seem literally to ignore who these plaintiffs are,
and how their lives are shaped by their social identities and affected
by the rules they seek to challenge. Time after time in standing 44 and
right-to-hearing45 cases the Court seems engaged in a desperate search
for legislative recognition as the touchstone of cognizable legal
interests. Yet, the affronts to our authenticity, to our understanding
of ourselves as multi-faceted individuals with unique histories and life
plans, are hardly satisfied by an almost random recognition of
"interest" in statutory provisions which, because of their generic
character, falsify our positions even as they recognize them.
The standing jurisprudence is a particularly rich source of instances
for both outrage and ironic humor. One of my favorites in the latter
camp is a case 46 involving a group that objected to a cross in a public
park. Because it was unlikely to have a sufficient legal interest for
standing as a group of "anti-establishmentarians," it transformed itself
into an environmental advocate for members whose hiking and
camping experiences would be impaired by the authorities' failure to
maintain the park in its natural state. As "environmentalists,"
plaintiffs could point to numerous statutes recognizing their
recreational and aesthetic interests. They thus achieved standing at
the expense of complete misrepresentations of their identity. One is
hard pressed to know whether to laugh or cry.
The administrative state's conversation about rightness or justness
is seldom more articulate than its fumbling with issues of authenticity.
Administrators by and large claim not to be making value judgments.
Those are specified in the statute to be administered. Administration
is just implementation; its rationality is to be judged by means-ends
convergence, not by cogent argument concerning the rightness of the
ends pursued.

42. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
43. O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 776 (1980).
44. The tortured search for recognition that plaintiffs are within the "zone of
interests" of a particular statute for purposes of determining their standing to bring
suit began in Ass'n of Data ProcessingServ. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
45. For a discussion of the need for positive law triggers to prompt due process
concerns see Jerry L. Mashaw, Dignitary Process:A Political Psychology of Liberal
Democratic Citizenship, 39 U. Fla. L. Rev. 433 (1987), and more generally, Jerry L.
Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State (1985).
46. ACLU Ga. v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 678 F.2d 1379
(11 th Cir. 1982), modified, 698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983).
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But we know this administrative claim to be hollow. To return to a
prior example, when the Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 told the
Secretary of Transportation to adopt regulations concerning the
performance of automobiles that "meet the need for motor vehicle
safety," it hardly answered the question of how much of what type of
regulation the society thought justified. But, the Secretary never
holds a hearing on what the statutory mandate means-on how much
automobile safety is needed and why. Rules are proposed and
justified in instrumental terms, with engineering estimates of accidents
avoided and lives saved, and economic analyses of costs and benefits.
At most, arguments about the "goodness," not the "rightness," of
the rules are generated by these exercises in reason-giving. Costbenefit analyses are done to determine whether, on some set of highly
debatable assumptions, social welfare will go up because of the
adoption of the rule. This is hardly a trivial question, but, as an
attempt to address the social morality of rulemaking, cost-benefit
analysis is a joke. Excruciatingly difficult, perhaps impossible,
questions concerning the value of human life-whether that value can
be expressed in monetary terms, whether monetary valuations should
be discounted if the life is to be saved at some future day, and so onlie just beneath the surface of all such analytic efforts. In the
administrator's analysis itself these issues usually must be swept under
the rug. To be sure, the academic literature debates such questions
endlessly,47 but administrators apparently believe, perhaps for good
reasons, that they must simply get on with their jobs. The rationality
of these exercises in social cost accounting can be questioned, but only
within the confines of the professional norms that have developed to
make the analytic exercise possible.
The ultimate issues are
sidestepped.
They lay buried, occasionally in long-forgotten
legislative debates, which resolved them only by a vote and expressed
the legislature's normative conclusions in Delphic statutory language.
I know of only one instance in which a Secretary of Transportation
attempted directly and publicly to address the questions of value left
at large by the Motor Vehicle Safety Act. William Coleman, when
Secretary of Transportation, issued an interesting, perhaps unique,
notice of proposed rulemaking' concerning the mandatory inclusion
of passive restraint devices in motor vehicles. As Coleman put it, his
statute required that he adopt rules that would eliminate
"unreasonable risks" to the public. But, he wondered, what could that
mean? Because of existing rules automobiles already contained
47. For critiques and defenses of cost benefit analysis in agency decision-making,
see Thomas 0. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 Admin. L. Rev. 7 (1998), and
Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the
Discounting of Hunan Lives, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 941 (1999). and authorities cited
therein.
48. Hearing Notice, 41 Fed. Reg. 24,070,24,071 (June 14. 1976).
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manual belts and shoulder harnesses which were, if used, as effective
as passive restraints. The problem was that the American public
didn't use them.
But, what did this imply, Coleman asked. That automobiles should
contain restraints that the motoring public couldn't avoid? Or did the
millions of decisions by American motorists not to wear their manual
restraint devices signal that the risks involved were perceived to be
acceptable? And, if acceptable to most Americans, should these risks
nevertheless be considered "unreasonable" pursuant to the statute? If
so, on what grounds? Moreover, Coleman wondered, should the
agency impose costly new requirements on all motorists in order to
protect those who didn't want them, while adding to the expense of
those who already used their manual devices and would gain no
benefit from passive ones? Was that fair?
Coleman's rulemaking issuance may not be unique in the annals of
administrative regulation, but I have read a fair number of such
pronouncements and I have never seen anything else quite like it.
Moreover, Coleman's almost plaintive request for instruction on these
issues of social value and distributional fairness were met by
deafening silence. Subsequent official documents justifying the
agency's ultimate decision suggest that no one said anything about
these issues worthy of comment as the rulemaking process moved,
glacially, toward its ultimate resolution.
IV. WHAT TO Do

I have no good answers today for how to deal with the missing
discourses of justice and authenticity in administrative law. But, it is
surely plausible to imagine that some of the contemporary enthusiasm
for privatization, devolution, regulatory negotiation and the like, are
driven in part by a desire to re-engage questions of justice and
authenticity that have been explored inadequately as we have built an
administrative state that is a monument to instrumental rationality. It
is possible to admire our institutions for their attention to the pursuit
of the general welfare, while being simultaneously uneasy about a
purely instrumental49 approach to policy choice. While it is rational to
pursue our ends by the most effective means available, it may seem
irrational to have such a desiccated conversation about what our
collective ends should be. And ultimately, as social beings as well as
individuals, we must understand how our own particular activities,
choices, and attachments can be rationalized as lives worth living
49. I do not wish to be heard as suggesting that either utilitarian or
consequentialist approaches to moral judgment necessarily must ignore either justice
constraints or issues of individual integrity or authenticity. For further discussion of
these matters see Elizabeth Ashford, Utilitarianism,Integrity and Partiality,97 J. Phil.
421 (2000) and Amartya Sen, Consequential Evaluation and Practical Reason, 97 J.
Phil. 477 (2000).
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within the context of a social reality in which collective choices must
also be made.
It may be that these tensions among the domains of rational
action-the conflict between our attempts to choose rational ends,
effectively manipulate the material world and live authentic lives-are
inevitable." Perhaps we can do little better in administrative law than
to bracket the questions of social justice and individual authenticity, to
treat them as pressing concerns, but as outside the purview of reasongiving in the administrative state. Perhaps.
I fear that such a path is dangerous. Inattention to questions of
justice and authenticity can cause us to devalue unnecessarily the
triumphs of administrative rationality. And, if we treat these
instrumental reasons as small things to be put in a jar, thereby
delegitimizing the only basis upon which the administrative state has
developed to justify its actions, we may leave it bereft of defenses.
In my view that would truly turn triumph into tragedy. I have not
criticized administrative law's project of rational action in order to
suggest that it should, or even can, be abandoned. The project of
broadening the base of administrative rationality is quite different
from the project of returning most social decision-making to the quite
different "rationality" of market transactions. If we want to continue
to understand

ourselves as homo sapiens, not just as homo

economicus, we must attempt to broaden the domain of
administrative reason, not abandon it as a failed idea. We must reimagine modernity in ways that address legitimate post-modern
anxieties. We must articulate how the law, in John Rawls' terms, can
be "reasonable" as well as "rational."'" And we must find ways to
embed those ideas in reason's preeminent, legal home, administrative
law.

50. For some more general reflections on the predicament of modernity, see, e.g.,
Ernest Gellner, Reason and Culture: The Historic Role of Rationality and
Rationalism (1992).
51. John Rawls, Political Liberalism 47-88.212-54 (1993).
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